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PANDEMIC, PROTEST, AND AGENCY:
Jury Service and Equal Protection in
a Future Defined by COVID-19
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Patrick C. Brayer*

“And as a right that was exercised for the benefit of the
community (like voting and jury service), rather than
for the benefit of the individual (like free speech or free
exercise), it belonged only to virtuous citizens.”

ee

–Amy Coney Barrett, (then) Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals1
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This Essay calls for an expansive view of Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection against the discriminatory empanelment of juries
grounded upon a culture of systemic racism. For an individual—or potential juror—fundamental elements of survival during a pandemic are
access to health care, safe transportation, and connective technology. Yet,
structural and systemic racism precludes many potential jurors of color
from securing these necessary supports, thus denying them the ability to
be recognized on juror source list or accommodated for jury service. Jury
service is a direct and impactful act of citizen agency over the justice system, and the systemic exclusion of individuals from jury service based on
race and economic status is a denial of that agency and a constitutional
violation. Supreme Court rulings like Duren v. Missouri are inadequate
to provide relief in the face of such violations and only provide outdated
and ineffectual remedies to this mass denial of equity.
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Patrick C. Brayer retired in 2021 from the St. Louis County Trial Office, where he
served as the Deputy District Defender and was a veteran of the trial division.
This Essay represents his personal opinions and beliefs and is a private project
completed on his own time, utilizing his personal resources. Special thanks and
recognition to Tamar Hoffman for her insights and observations and her contribution to this 2020 Advocacy Initiative. Special thanks to social justice advocate
Christine Dragonette for her suggestions and information and for all her good
work on behalf of the underserved communities of the St. Louis area.
Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 462–63 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).
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In the shadow of the COVID-19 crisis, our legal system is facing a
historic challenge; how that challenge is met will forever define how we
administer justice and provide due process and equal protection. When
faced with crisis, disruption, and change, our system of laws and procedural guarantees should adapt and become more accommodating to the
realities of a worldwide pandemic. Unfortunately, as judges and lawyers
move to reopen a system of juries and jury trials, courts are likely to ignore how people experiencing poverty (especially Black, Indigenous, and
people of color) will participate in new and creative models designed
around health and safety. Regrettably, the originalist views of a newly
seated Justice Barrett,2 as stated above, are evidence of a U.S. Supreme
Court primed to abandon greater protections for potential jurors who
are victims of structural racial exclusion. This potential neglect can only
be diminished if our highest courts embrace an expansive view of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection against the discriminatory seating of
both criminal and civil juries grounded upon a culture of systemic racism.
A blind spot, opaque to poverty and race, exists in the legal profession that tepidly attempts to assemble juries representative of a fair
cross-section of the community.3 Communities traditionally unrecognized through the lens of systemic racism will continue to be ignored as
courts implement pandemic and post-pandemic procedures for trials, jury
selection, and jury deliberations. The circumstances of people in poverty,
who are disproportionately Black and Brown, must be accounted for in
any new COVID-19-influenced jury participation arrangement. Echoing
the movement that took to the streets in the wake of the tragic murder
of George Floyd, the justice system must include the voices of people
of color who have been systemically excluded from legal processes. For
2.
3.

Id.
Thomas R. Neumeier, A Burden Too Heavy: Berghuis v. Smith and the Fading Right to a Jury from a Fair Cross-Section of the Community, 31 B.C. Third
World L.J. E. Supp. 69, 83 (2011).
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an individual—or potential juror—some fundamental elements of survival during a pandemic are access to health care, safe transportation,
and connective technology. Yet, structural and systemic racism precludes
many potential jurors of color from securing these necessary supports,
thus denying them the ability to be recognized on juror source lists or
accommodated for jury service.
A legal mechanism that can be employed to respond to movements
for racial justice is a more equitable reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. Systemic racism and discriminatory application of “color-blind”
laws violate equal protection and deny agency for Black, Indigenous, and
people of color. This pervasive truth tarnishes juries, a cornerstone of
the U.S. justice system. Jury service is a direct and impactful act of citizen
agency over the justice system. The systematic exclusion of individuals
from jury service based on race and economic status is a denial of that
agency and a grave violation of constitutional rights. Supreme Court rulings like Duren v. Missouri4 are inadequate to provide relief in the face
of such violations and provide outdated and ineffectual remedies to this
mass denial of agency and inclusion in the justice system.
I reflect on our nation’s Black, Indigenous, and residents of color
and their right to be recognized and accommodated for jury service—
especially in this time of pandemic and structural inequality—by realizing
equal protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. The voices of the
Black Lives Matter movement after the killing of George Floyd, along
with particular rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court from the 1940s (another decade of great national challenge) have informed a more expansive
legal model of equal protection and agency for the victims of systemic
racism. For originalists like Justice Barrett, the 1940s Supreme Court’s
expansive interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause is more instructive since those judicial beliefs were formed in the direct aftermath of
Fourteenth Amendment ratification. This Essay posits that systemic racism results in the discriminatory application of jury laws, for both criminal
and civil trials, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, which denies
agency in our justice system for Black, Indigenous, and people of color
and people who live in poverty.
To understand this issue, this Essay explores equal protection and
jury service through the lens of real people fighting to overcome the systemic barriers of racism. Understanding the impact of systemic racism
is a requirement to meaningfully critique Duren, as I do in the last Parts
of this Essay.

The Elements That Create Vulnerable Communities
In the early days of the pandemic, the U.S. Surgeon General, commenting on the impact of the disease, stated: “[w]e do not think people of
color are biologically or genetically predisposed to get COVID-19 . . . but

rep

I.

4.

Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
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Matt Perez, Surgeon General Tells People of Color to Avoid Alcohol, Drugs
to Protect Against Coronavirus; Defends ‘Big Mama’ Comments, Forbes
(Apr. 10, 2020, 7:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mattperez/2020/04/10/
surgeon-general-tells-people-of-color-to-avoid-alcohol-drugs-to-protectagainst-coronavirus-defends-big-mama-comments/#2b045c7c74f9 [https://perma.
cc/779K-Q886]; see also Juana Summers, U.S. Surgeon General: People of Color
‘Socially Predisposed’ to Coronavirus Exposure, NPR (Apr. 10, 2020, 3:24 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/04/10/832026070/
u-s-s urgeon-general-people-of-color-socially-predisposed-to-coronavirusexposure [https://perma.cc/82KJ-MUB8].
Perez, supra note 5; see also Linda Villarosa, ‘A Terrible Price’: The Deadly Racial Disparities of Covid-19 in America, N.Y. Times (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/04/29/magazine/racial-disparities-covid-19.amp.html [https://
perma.cc/LTP6-RTYH].
See generally Patrick C. Brayer, Foster v. Chatman and the Failings of Batson, 102
Iowa L. Rev. Online 53 (2016).

rin
t

5.

no

tp

ee

rr

they are socially predisposed to coronavirus exposure and have a higher
incidence of the very diseases that put you at risk for severe complications of coronavirus.”5 From my experience of advocating for clients
of color, I have learned that this social predisposition is more akin to a
social imposition, and that systemic factors have created this problem.
One commenter responded to the General’s comments by observing
“[i]n New York City, the epicenter of the coronavirus, Black and Latino
people are dying at twice the rate as white people, likely due to factors
such as air pollution and density of cities, jobs that don’t allow teleworking, pre-existing medical conditions that also illustrate racial disparities
and denial of tests because of inherent biases.”6
The high population density of cities made me reflect on my clients
and jurors in poverty who must depend on crowded public transportation
systems and multiple bus transfers to arrive at a distant courthouse. Jobs
that do not allow teleworking call attention to the unaccommodating nature of all low-wage jobs as people in poverty struggle every day with
balancing childcare and the minimal wage that feeds those same children.
I understood the problem of preexisting conditions as affordable preventative medical care is geographically removed from many of my clients,
just as other government services are similarly scarce in many lower-income communities of color. And the inherent biases experienced in
testing are not foreign to Black jurors who are struck from mostly white
juries sitting in judgment of Black clients.7 The elements that support
survival in a time of pandemic are some of the same elements that equally protect an individual’s inclusion and recognition for jury service. In
the following Subparts, I discuss the systemic barriers to the elements of
health care, transportation, and technology, and how these elements are
not equally available to all.

rep
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See Michal Grinstein-Weiss & Brinda Gupta, We Don’t Need a Map to Tell Us
Who COVID-19 Hits the Hardest in St. Louis, Brookings Inst. (Apr. 6, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/04/06/we-dont-need-a-map-totell-us-who-covid-19-hits-the-hardest-in-st-louis/?preview_id=797968 [https://
perma.cc/2YBK-XRPC].
Ashley Cole, ‘It’s About Social Inequities’: Data Shows African Americans are
More Impacted by COVID-19 in the St. Louis Area, KSDK (Apr. 9, 2020, 2:10
PM), https://www.ksdk.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/st-louis-city-racialdata-covid-19-cases/63-f6a56b31-b744-4429-948b-d49cf50c3f57 [https://perma.
cc/L32V-64DX].
See id.
Grinstein-Weiss & Gupta, supra note 8.
See id.
Emily Woodbury, Tracking COVID-19 Cases By ZIP Code Highlights Inequity
In St. Louis Region, St. Louis Pub. Radio (Apr. 14, 2020, 5:05 PM), https://news.
stlpublicradio.org/post/tracking-covid-19-cases-zip-code-highlights-inequityst-louis-region#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/688X-TJTK] (quoting Dr. Laurie
Punch).
Hannah Recht & Lauren Weber, Black Americans Are Getting COVID Vaccines at Lower Rates than White Americans, Sci. Am. (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.
scientificamerican.com/article/black-americans-are-getting-covid-vaccines-atlower-rates-than-white-americans [https://perma.cc/P8EA-TBXX].
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The disparate impact of COVID-19’s devastating effects on marginalized, underserved, Black and Brown communities is undeniable.8
Low-income Black communities have experienced much higher rates
of COVID-19 infections than white, affluent communities in the same
cities.9 The racial injustices in infection rates is evident in cities like St.
Louis, Chicago, Detroit, and New York.10
“African Americans are at greater risk because they are more likely
to be low income” and “least likely to have the resources to fight” the
virus’s impact.11 Many individuals of color have a dearth of resources
because disinvestment and segregation have systemically robbed them of
the essentials for survival and advancement.12 I believe that the systemic
bias that decreases the number of Black, Indigenous, and people of color
and people in poverty on juries is indistinguishable from the institutional
prejudice that fueled the disparate impact of COVID-19. A doctor working in a predominantly Black community commented, “[b]ecause we live
in such a highly segregated city, which has scars in it carved by the knife
that is structural racism . . . it’s not surprising that there is such a dramatic
difference in the incidence of the disease and then the death by the disease.”13 Disparate early vaccine rollouts that disadvantaged Black and
Brown communities were further evidence of how medical infrastructure
benefited predominantly white communities who had greater access to
transportation and digital technology.14
To conceptualize this national tragedy, I am informed by Black
and Brown residents how COVID-19 has impacted their potential to be
recognized and to participate as jurors. Because Black, Indigenous, and
people of color possess an enhanced risk to the devastation of COVID-19,
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their unique and serious circumstances when called to jury service must
be acknowledged, accommodated, and respected. Furthermore, their
potential to serve must not be overlooked because structural racism (exacerbated by the pandemic) has made it too difficult and dangerous to be
included on a juror source list.15 In the face of COVID-19, keeping vulnerable jurors healthy and included is an essential element that supports
agency in the justice system and constitutional equal protection. This
element crumbles if courts opt for juror exclusion over juror accommodation or rely on noninclusive juror source list methodology.
B.

The Element of Transportation
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The COVID-19 crisis required individuals to become more reflective about the simple interactions they experience throughout their
day. Such thinking was and is dominated by how to keep distance from
friends, avoid contact with people passed in the store, and reduce surfaces
touched throughout the day. When it comes to reimagining a safe yet
inclusive jury participation model, the courts must equally reflect on the
interactions people in poverty experience as they travel from home to
courthouse. Will a low-income or no-income individual be required to
take public transportation to satisfy a jury summons? When they do, who
will they pass on the street on the way to and from the bus stop? Who
will they interact with on a bus and will that bus be crowded? How many
crowded trains or buses and transfers will be required on their roundtrip
journey? How many face masks or containers of hand sanitizer must
be purchased to safely facilitate a trip to jury duty? Comparatively, individuals with adequate income are more likely to travel from home to
courthouse roundtrip and in a personal automobile with no masks required for the trip.
Residents of one predominantly Black Midwest community typically earn less than their counterparts in the rest of the region,16 and “25
percent of MetroBus [regional] ridership originates in [that community]”.17 Because of the many residents living in poverty, “[t]here are many
areas where 15 percent to 45 percent of the households do not have access to a vehicle, with a few areas showing a staggering 70 percent of
households without a vehicle.”18 In the early days of the pandemic, these
same residents were warned, “[d]ue to fewer workforce resources, it
is necessary to reduce the frequency of MetroBus services, and riders
are encouraged to plan ahead for delays and allow more time for their

15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
John L. Wagner, Feasibility Study for the Implementation of On-Site Medical Services at MetroLink Stations 6 (2017).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 7.
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MetroBus Riders Encouraged to Plan Ahead for Delays, St Louis Metro Transit Next Stop Blog, (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.metrostlouis.org/nextstop/
covid-19-update-metrobus-riders-encouraged-to-plan-ahead-for-delays [https://
perma.cc/HV8A-JE3K].
Jasmine Payoute, Metro Transit Bus Driver Dies from COVID-19, Bi-State Says
Drivers Are Essential Employees, KSDK TV St. Louis (Apr. 8, 2020, 5:01 PM),
https://www.wqad.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/metro-transit-bus-
driver-dies-covid-19-bi-state-drivers-essential-employees/63-66a197ae-4aaf40c9-82ec-b21ac1078093 [https://perma.cc/75UF-LTZX].
See State v. Eighinger, 931 S.W.2d 835, 842 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 843, 842 n.2; see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 122–23 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (“Nevertheless, insofar as group wealth discrimination involves wealth over which the disadvantaged individual has no significant control, it represents in fact a more serious
basis of discrimination than does personal wealth. For such discrimination is
no reflection of the individual’s characteristics or his abilities.”); id. at 24 (“[A]t
least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages.”).
Laura Bliss, Hit Hard by Covid-19, Transit Workers Call for Shutdowns,
Bloomberg City Lab (Apr. 13, 2020, 2:33 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2020-04-13/as-transit-workers-get-sick-unions-mull-shutdowns
[https://perma.cc/R33Z-UN2G].
Id.
Monarch Travel Servs., Inc. v. Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d 552, 554
(9th Cir. 1972).

no

19.

tp

ee

rr

commutes”19 and to “only ride when absolutely necessary.”20 This reality
of life in poverty has always posed an obstacle to litigants dependent on
an inclusive and representative jury.21 Past rulings held that trial courts
“did not err in excusing women with small children at home who claimed
that jury duty would create a hardship” and appellate judges have cited
arguments that no authority from the U.S. Supreme Court finds “exclusion based on poverty provides a basis for finding an Equal Protection
violation.”22
In the COVID-19 moment and beyond, jurors in poverty face serious health implications as they attempt to comply with a jury summons.
One tragic example lies in the initial number of transit workers diagnosed with COVID-19 and the resulting loss of life.23 “Because of service
cuts, fewer vehicles and longer headways” have resulted in “packed conditions on some trains and buses.”24
Will our nation’s courts consider this threat to the health of a distinct community and expend resources for safe juror travel, or will other
less constitutional means be employed, reminiscent of past decisions? As
one court stated, “A rich man can choose to drive a limousine; a poor
man may have to walk. The poor man’s lack of choice in his mode of
travel may be unfortunate, but it is not unconstitutional.”25 Will it be
easier for courts to unconditionally force attendance or just routinely
grant low-income people of color exemptions or ignore nonattendance?
Agency through equal protection exists only when courts provide safe
and healthy transportation to and from jury service for all residents, both
now and when the virus abates.
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The Element of Digital Connection

26.

Matt Reynolds, Could Zoom Jury Trials Become the Norm During the Coronavirus Pandemic?, ABA J. Web First (May 11, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/could-zoom-jury-trials-become-a-reality-during-thepandemic [https://perma.cc/EBJ9-UFHA].
Id.
Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts., Managing Juries and Jury Trials During Covid-19
1, 18 (2020).
Nate Raymond, Texas Tries a Pandemic First: A Jury Trial by Zoom, Reuters
(May 18, 2020, 7:19 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronaviruscourts-texas/texas-tries-a-pandemic-first-a-jury-trial-by-zoom-idUSKBN22U1FE [https://perma.cc/VH2A-KK2B].
Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts., Technology Options for Jury Trials and Grand
Jury Proceedings 1–17 (2020).
Reynolds, supra note 26.
Douglas Broom, Coronavirus Has Exposed the Digital Divide Like Never Before, World Econ. Forum (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/
agenda/2020/04/coronavirus-covid-19-pandemic-digital-divide-internet-databroadband-mobbile [https://perma.cc/FVC6-EJZP].
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As judges and court administrators considered digital solutions to
the dilemma of safe jury participation in the era of COVID-19, experts
reflected if jury selection and deliberations can be conducted remotely
and from the safety of a juror’s home.26 “With courts suspending trials
because of the virus, some legal experts say a virtual criminal jury trial
is a near certainty.”27 On training how to manage juries and jury trials
during COVID-19, the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) initially
indicated that jurisdictions are not quite ready for cyber juries, but the
Center’s jury experts also communicated the forewarning: “YET.”28 By
May of 2020, Texas had conducted the first jury trial by Zoom and supreme courts in Indiana and Arizona had cleared the way for jurors to
appear remotely in some proceedings.29 Soon after, the NCSC published
guidance on how to conduct remote proceedings for any stage of a civil
or criminal jury trial.30
Many lawyers and judges have taken issue with the logistical and
legal complexities present with such a jury participation model.31 Even
more concerning is the digital divide between the have and have-nots of
connection.32 Will courts consider the number of households in poverty
(and people of color) lacking computers, smart phones, or internet connection before convening a remote proceeding, or will judges explicitly or
implicitly construct barriers to the participation of individuals with limited access to technology? When I contemplate a remote participation
model for (more likely civil) jury trials, I fear judges will conveniently
ignore communities impacted by poverty.
Communities of color experience significant disparities in access to
digital connection. Nationally, “[w]hite residents (82 percent) are more
likely to have broadband in their homes than Black (70 percent), Hispanic (74 percent), or American Indian (65 percent) residents,” and living in

29.
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32.
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a rural community can increase this chasm.33 “A large part of this is likely
due to wide socio-economic divides that exist between these groups,” and
“[t]hese disparities can exacerbate income, educational, and health gaps
that we already see between Americans.”34
When it comes to the digital divide, will the courts be willing to
spend scarce resources in order to provide technological access for lower
income jurors? The NCSC warned that, because of the disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on racial and ethnic minorities, courts should
provide remote access options for jurors with limited technological resources.35 I fear the true cost of a jury representing a fair cross-section of
the community will not be a priority in the face of growing trial dockets
and dwindling tax revenue. Courts have rationalized when low-income
individuals found it financially difficult to serve on a jury: “Not to provide
childcare is a rational decision, facially neutral with regard to race and
gender. As there is no intention to discriminate, the disproportionate
impact on minorities and women is not sufficient to violate the equal
protection clause” and “government as a whole, including the judiciary,
faces severe constraints on resources.”36 This judicial tradition of denying
equal protection status to residents in poverty is likely to continue postCOVID-19 as judges implement cost-effective, technologically-forward
schemes for juror participation.

The Three Elements
Three of many elements needed to sustain a healthy community
amid a worldwide pandemic are indistinguishable from the three priorities that must be addressed by courts when assembling a jury from a fair
cross-section of the community. These three components that must exist
in a population if a representative jury is to be summoned in a current
and post-COVID-19 environment are access to community resources,
safe transportation, and access to technology.
With poverty comes transiency and the unfortunate reality of
mobility, as low- or no-income individuals change addresses “to find employment, to join family or friends, to escape high crime rates or their own
domestic abuse, and to provide their children with better schools and better housing.”37 As people experiencing poverty transition in the current
and post-COVID-19 world, their fight to remain healthy and recognized
by the courts becomes more difficult. Pre-pandemic juror participation
studies found “undeliverable, disqualification, excusal and failure-to-appear rates tend to disproportionately decrease minority representation

rin
t

no

tp

II.

rep

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

U.S. Cong. Joint Econ. Comm., America’s Digital Divide 4 (2017), https://
www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/ff7b3d0b-bc00-4498-9f9d-3e56ef95088f/
the-digital-divide-.pdf [https://perma.cc/5594-TMTF].
Id.
Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts., supra note 30.
State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 510 (Mo. 1992).
Len Biernat, Limiting Mobility and Improving Student Achievement, 23 Hamline L. Rev. 1, 4 (1999).
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38.

Elizabeth Neely, Addressing Nonsystematic Factors Contributing to the Underrepresentation of Minorities as Juror, 47 Ct. Rev. 96, 98 (2011).
See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 494.410 (2016); Common Questions, Mo. Cts., https://www.
courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=996 [https://perma.cc/P44T-KPXY]; Jury Frequently
Asked Questions, U.S. Dist. Ct. for E. Dist. Mo., https://www.moed.uscourts.gov/
faqs/jury [https://perma.cc/ND3J-VQDU]; Paula Hannaford-Agor, A New Take
on How Jury Service Is Akin to Voting, Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts. Jury News
(Nov. 2017), http://www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/6100/
jury-news-nov-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7R6-QJYR].
Hannaford-Agor, supra note 39.
Jack Kelly, Nearly 50 Million Americans Have Filed For Unemployment—Here’s
What’s Really Happening, Forbes (July 9, 2020, 12:35 PM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/jackkelly/2020/07/09/nearly-50-million-americans-have-filed-for-
unemployment-heres-whats-really-happening/#70687db027d3 [https://perma.cc/
ZZX9-APJD].
Neumeier, supra note 3, at 80.
Id.
Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts., Jury Managers’ Toolbox: A Primer on Fair Cross
Section Jurisprudence 5 (2010).
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due to socio-economic factors such as mobility rates . . . and financial
hardship for lower-income individuals.”38 The elements that support
individual survival in the era of COVID-19 are the same elements that
inform judicial recognition. Unfortunately, these elements have become
even more fragile and tenuous just as our need for representative juries
becomes more essential.
Low-income, predominantly Black and Brown communities face
significant challenges in obtaining resources, finding safe transportation
to these resources, and accessing technology in homes; but without these
tools, residents are less likely to be recognized for jury duty. Many state
and federal courts obtain juror names and contact information from
driver’s license and state identification (ID) lists and from voter registration rolls.39 Comparatively, only a few states utilize “income tax rolls,
unemployment compensation, and public welfare lists.”40 If a potential
juror is required to relocate because they or a member of their household are one of the millions of Americans who lost their job because of
COVID-19,41 they must register their address change for the summons
to be delivered.42 While facially practical and fair, this requirement can
be overwhelming upon viewing this condition to jury service through the
lens of poverty, racial inequity, and the pandemic. Being in poverty or
being Black increases the probability of mobility and “being more mobile
increases the likelihood that an individual will not receive a summons
to serve on a jury or that the address the State has on record is no longer current.”43
It has been found that “[f]ailure-to-appear rates and excusal rates
are likewise highly correlated with socio-economic status” but “have historically been considered forms on nonsystematic exclusion” by courts
that cite their inability to make low-income jurors register their new
address.44 Does systemic racism equate to systematic exclusion in a
COVID-19 world when the act of updating an official address is more
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Brennan Ctr. for Just., Citizens without Proof: A Survey of Americans’
Possession of Documentary Proof of Citizenship and Photo Identification
3 (2006).
Patrick Marion Bradley, The Invisibles: The Cruel Catch-22 of Being Poor with
No ID, Wash. Post (June 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/
magazine/what-happens-to-people-who-cant-prove-who-they-are/2017/06/14/
fc0aaca2-4215-11e7-adba-394ee67a7582_story.html [https://perma.cc/YM6W6YML].
Email from Christine Dragonette, Dir. of Soc. Ministry St. Francis Xavier Coll.
Church, to author (May 22, 2020) (on file with author) (“Through my experience
in our program over the past nearly seven years, I have seen firsthand the barriers people in poverty face to obtaining Missouri State ID cards. Clients of our
program often lack the required documents to receive a State ID.”).
Id.
Brennan Ctr. for Just., supra note 45, at 3.
See Neely, supra note 38, at 98.
Voter Registration Information, St. Louis Cnty. Mo., https://stlouiscountymo.
gov/st-louis-county-government/board-of-elections/elections/voter-services/
voter-registration-information [https://perma.cc/WCM6-YPNT].
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dangerous for Black and low-income residents? In 2006, researchers
found “that ten percent of voting-age citizens who have current photo ID
do not have photo ID with both their current address and their current
legal name,” and that people in poverty, the elderly, and minority populations are less likely to possess these needed documents.45 Since 2006,
“federal requirements for IDs have grown tougher, contributing to a loop
that can help keep people trapped in poverty.”46
Advocates for individuals in poverty have confronted many obstacles in attempting to obtain or renew state IDs for residents who lack
financial resources.47 Fees, fees required to obtain necessary supporting
documentation, and bureaucratic barriers are all factors in discouraging
people in poverty from obtaining state identification48 and thus from
being considered for jury service on a source list. In addition to these traditional barriers in the United States, a survey found that “[t]wenty-five
percent of African-American voting-age citizens have no current government-issued photo ID, compared to eight percent of white voting-age
citizens.”49 Ironically, the reason many states added state non-driver IDs
to the source list initially was due to the relative ease and low cost of
obtaining such an ID, which was intended to increase the participation
of nonwhite jurors.50
When considering the inclusiveness of a juror source list derived
from voters, the “[a]cceptable forms of ID to register” are often associated with an application fee, duplication fee, a possible trip to a government
office, or a degree of monetary status like a job or government benefit.51
Common sense dictates an individual who loses their job or apartment
(in the era of COVID-19 and beyond) will not always have a bank statement, utility bill, paycheck, government check, government document, or
current state ID with a current address that some states require.52 “These

47.
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voters are disproportionately low-income, racial and ethnic minorities,
the elderly, and people with disabilities.”53
Before the economic downturn of 2008, it was estimated that
thirteen million American citizens did not have access to passports, naturalization papers, or birth certificates, and that low-income individuals
were two times as likely not to have these documents available.54 In addition to increased food prices and record unemployment in the era of
COVID-19,55 the expenses of obtaining documentation for voting purposes “are significant—especially for minority group and low-income
voters—typically ranging from about $75 to $175” in some states.56 The
Federal Jury Selection and Service Act has emphasized in order to promote fair cross-section requirements and nondiscrimination provisions
in the Act, federal courts may need to use other or additional sources
not connected to voting “where necessary.”57 Unfortunately, many district courts still rely solely on registration lists or active voter lists as the
source of their juror list.58
Critics of this Essay will point out, and I will acknowledge, it is not
impossible for a Black, Indigenous, person of color to be recognized for
jury service, but courts must consider that it is comparatively much easier
for a white person of means to access the elements of recognition and
participation. Equity and agency will be denied for people of color if the
Supreme Court adopts a more originalist view.59 Unfortunately, I detect
in Justice Barrett’s writings a judicial belief system that will equate not
registering to vote or not obtaining a government ID with the status of
being a non-“virtuous citizen.”60 A more palatable label will likely be
used as some Justices deny a mere “civic” right, but the impact will remain: the denial of the “individual,” fundamental right of serving on a
jury for people of color.61

III. COVID-19 and the Need for Equal Protection
Sixth Amendment fair cross-section and Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment due process claims will become a common practice for
criminal defense attorneys as some jurisdictions push to commence jury
trials in the face of the disparate impact of COVID-19.62 The challenge
ACLU, Fact Sheet on Voter ID Laws (2017), https://www.aclu.org/other/
oppose-voter-id-legislation-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/D2UA-3BNB].
Brennan Ctr. for Just., supra note 45, at 3.
Ben Popken, Food Prices Rose in June for the Sixth-Straight Month, NBC News
(July 14, 2020, 12:14 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/foodprices-rose-june-sixth-straight-month-n1233747 [https://perma.cc/4MCJ-2RQE].
Richard Sobel, Harv. L. Sch. Inst. for Race & Just., The High Cost of ‘Free’
Photo Voter Identification Cards 2 (2014).
28 U.S.C. § 1863; see also Hannaford-Agor, supra note 39.
Hannaford-Agor, supra note 39.
See Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 454, 464 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).
See id.
See id.
See Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts., supra note 28.
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with such claims will be confronting the antiquated yet entrenched judicial philosophy in Duren requiring that “underrepresentation is due
to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process” and
further, that the underrepresentation be of “a distinctive group in the
community.”63 These outdated standards fail to capture the reality of how
environmental, economic, and systemic bias and structural racism against
people of color have resulted in the underresourcing of communities, and
thus, the underrecognition of minorities and individuals in poverty when
juries are assembled.
The COVID-19 experience has informed us (and our courts) how
Black, Indigenous, and people of color who live in poverty are “distinct”
and “cognizable,”64 and that their imposed vulnerability is a result of hundreds of years of brutal enslavement, followed by a century of legally
sanctioned explicit racial prejudice, and confirmed by additional years of
systemic disinvestment and rationalized bias. Duren fails to acknowledge
how systematic exclusion in the jury selection process is indistinguishable from when a group of people (people of color experiencing poverty)
are systemically excluded from the resources necessary to be recognized
and to safely participate in jury service.65 The seemingly progressive, decades-old ruling in Duren will give trial courts continued cover to ignore
jury pools that are obviously “not fair and reasonable in relation to the
number of such persons in the community”66 by requiring litigants to
identify the “systematic exclusion” within the selection process proper.67
“This heightened burden is especially problematic for criminal defendants when socioeconomic factors are inextricably linked to issues of
proof,” yet the Supreme Court failed to recognize this link as it devolved
on Sixth Amendment Duren protections in 2010 with its ruling in Berghuis v. Smith (Berghuis II).68
Before the impact of COVID-19, “[m]ost instances of minority underrepresentation [were] due to intransigent socioeconomic factors that
traditionally have been exempted from enforcement under the fair cross
section requirement for the simple reason that courts cannot preemptively solve the underlying socioeconomic conditions themselves.”69 In a
COVID-19 environment, it has become comparatively more dangerous
and difficult for people of color and people experiencing poverty to be recognized for and to participate in jury service. A narrow reading of Duren
will allow courts to ignore this grave problem of underrepresentation as
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3, at 82.
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administrators fail to evaluate the efficacy of pre-COVID-19 source list
procedures, provide healthy modes of transportation to the courthouse,
and provide needed technology to jurors in poverty. I fear the courts
will default to the practice of excusing jurors when their participation
becomes inconvenient and costly.70
A few judges and justices in both state and federal courts have provided leadership on our nation’s path toward truly representative jury
pools. “Some courts in recent years have expanded the scope of systematic exclusion to include factors that may fall outside of the court’s ability
to prevent, but for which reasonably effective and cost-efficient remedies
exist.”71 State courts have struck down source list schemes that rely solely
on voter registration lists and federal district courts have proposed oversampling of nonwhite ZIP codes as a remedy for high failure-to-appear
rates in predominantly minority communities.72 As early as 1984, the California Supreme Court made it clear that it would not allow inaction to
evolve into discrimination when administrators compile jury lists.73
The U.S. Supreme Court’s currently favored Sixth Amendment
analysis of forbidding only systematic exclusion is potentially a paper
barrier, serving as a mere rationalization for resulting, majority-white
juries of means.74 Will the Supreme Court cling to the reasoning that
courts cannot force lower-income people to register to vote or obtain a
state ID? Under this standard, exclusion will continue to germinate from
state inaction in poor communities of color where juror source lists favor
the white, the employed, and the healthy, and state disinvestment serves
as a catalyst to poverty and disease. Judicial standards like “systematic
exclusion” of a “cognizable group”75 are barriers to future litigants of the
pandemic who seek to protect jurors of color and jurors in poverty. As
insightful courts, and a few astute legislatures,76 work toward greater due
process rights for defendants, the core intellectual argument for more
inclusive juries can be salvaged from historical voices calling for an expansive view of equal protection guarantees.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has
historically evolved into a systematic analysis of the intentionality of
“official” discrimination,77 the protection of a fundamental right, the implementation of judicial scrutiny, and the identification of a protected
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
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See State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 510 (Mo. 1992) (en banc).
Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts., supra note 44, at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
See Berghuis v. Smith (Berghuis II), 559 U.S. 314, at 333 (2010); see also Neumeier, supra note 3, at 69, 83.
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rolls, unemployment compensation, and public welfare lists. Two states use
unique statewide lists—the permanent fund in Alaska, and an annual statewide
census in Massachusetts—both of which are extremely inclusive and representative . . . ”).
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2004); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 143 (Ginsberg J., dissenting).
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group (or suspect class).78 In reality, the Equal Protection Clause is a
more broad, wide-ranging, and inconsistently utilized tool of the Court,79
brought forth when inequities call for a strong declaration of condemnation80 or national conflict wants of a unified remedy.81 From the 1880
ruling in Strauder v. West Virginia,82 which confronted expressed state racial discrimination on juries while authorizing gender discrimination, to
Bush v. Gore in 2000,83 equal protection analysis has historically bent to
the will of each Justices’ moral belief system at the time.84
In 1977, the Court noted “proof of racially discriminatory intent or
purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause”
while conceding “some contrary indications may be drawn from some
of our cases.”85 By 2000, the Court, ruling in Bush, embraced an equal
protection argument with no mention of discriminatory intent, a protected group, or race, but imposed a remedy that arguably disenfranchised
numerous Black voters in Florida.86 When Justices took an equal protection stand against discrimination on grand juries, they broadly cited
the discriminatory actions of private citizens in the community.87 Conversely, when they declined to confront racism in the same era and in the
same state, the Court cited the mere oathtaking of jury commissioners
as evidence of nondiscrimination.88 Fourteenth Amendment protection
historically presents when the Court, originalist justices included, takes
a stand against a perceived injustice regardless of governmental intent.89
I disagree with scholars and judges who narrowly affirm, “An Equal
Protection challenge [only] concerns the process of selecting jurors, or
the allegation that selection decisions were made with discriminatory
intent,” and a well-intentioned official cannot be the source of such a
violation when community representation is unintentionally yet disproportionately impacted.90 The lasting, yet often forgotten, bond between
juries being “truly representative of the community” with equal protection was cemented by the Court’s 1940 ruling in Smith v. Texas.91 Years
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later, Taylor v. Louisiana merely expanded these protections under a
broader Sixth Amendment umbrella; unfortunately, while embracing
Smith, the Court in Taylor (arguably unintentionally) veered the focus
away from Smith’s core equal protection principle.92 This continued diversion away from the Fourteenth Amendment likely resulted because
strong dissents in both Taylor and Duren attempted to use equal protection analysis as an analytical pretext for allowing the continued disparate
exclusion of women on juries.93
In Smith,94 the majority was determined to embrace equal protection as a remedy against prejudicial state actions that were proven less
intentional yet equally impactful.95 For Justice Black, the expressed intent of the law had little meaning if the result of state action or inaction
was a nonrepresentative grand jury.96 Notably, the Court found the Texas
statutory scheme at issue “is not, in itself, unfair; it is capable of being
carried out with no racial discrimination.”97 Justice Black acknowledged
testimony from jury commissioners in which they denied people of color
were “intentionally, arbitrarily or systematically discriminated against,”98
but he took issue with the commissioners’ authority to select people they
knew when the commissioners were (in their words) “not personally acquainted” with any Black individuals.99
I find the old Texas scheme similar to how many individuals are
ignored for jury service today. On an abstract level, judges and court
administrators understand some potential qualified jurors of color are
without access to an automobile, or are without a computer connection,
or choose not to have an ID or register to vote because of bureaucratic
and financial barriers, or have little access to the type of medical care that
decreases the likelihood of contracting COVID-19. Conversely, a majority of legal professionals are not “personally acquainted”100 with that
level of struggle to survive, as our judicial system disregards individuals
who fail to make it on the source lists or fail to receive a summons at a
temporary address.101
The promise for Black and Brown residents to be recognized for,
and to safely participate in, jury service comes from cases like Smith and
other powerful equal protection cases of the same period that forbid discriminatory state actions against “basic civil and political rights . . . based
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527–528 (1975).
See id. at 539 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 371
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94. Smith, 311 U.S. 128.
95. Id at 132.
96. Id at 130.
97. Id. at 130–31.
98. Id. at 131.
99. Id. at 132.
100. Id.
101. See Hannaford-Agor, supra note 39, at 2–3; see also Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts.,
supra note 44, at 5.
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on considerations of race or color.”102 In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Court,
sitting in (and informed by) past periods of economic devastation (the
Great Depression) and tragic death (World War II), diminished the need
to prove actual discrimination in Smith103 while expanding the concept
of state action under equal protection analysis.104 The relevance of these
rulings, combined with the dire nature of our current circumstances of
litigation in a pandemic, presents advocates with an obligation to revisit
meaningful equal protection analysis when vulnerable populations are
excluded, ignored, or are not accommodated for jury service.
Since people of color and people in poverty are a distinct “group”105
impacted by this virus, it is discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause when trials are conducted absent their voices. What has made
people of color and people in poverty a legally impacted “group” are
the years of segregation and structural disinvestment that serves as a
constant frame to “political power, cultural influence, health, wealth, education, and employment.”106 In the words of past Justices, “in evil or
reckless hands,” the power to exclude, ignore, or refuse to accommodate
diverse voices “can cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear.”107
The devastating impact of this virus on communities of color has
revealed the flaw in how courts currently analyze fair cross-section claims
under the Sixth Amendment and Equal Protection challenges under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court continues to be blind to
how continued racial persecution comes in the form of an unrecognized
prejudice that is real yet undetectable by a narrow interpretation of discrimination.108 One example of this myopic view is in the evolution of
how “[a]n Equal Protection challenge concerns the process of selecting
jurors, or the allegation that selection decisions were made with discriminatory intent.”109 The perpetuation of this standard in contemporary
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note 90.
109. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 51.
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court rulings110 is evidence of how the judiciary ignores the devastating
impact of structural, environmental, and systemic racism on our communities and on our juries while failing to recognize how rationalized bias in
the minds of litigators continues to marginalize jurors of color.111
Fundamental principles of liberty and equal treatment inseparably
intertwine Fifth Amendment due process, Sixth Amendment trial rights,
and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process guarantees into one unified shield against disparate impacts caused by both
federal and state actors.112 Equal access and equal recognition is equal
protection in a society that values the promise of inclusion and participation for “any person.”113 “The fact that the written words of a state’s laws
hold out a promise that no such discrimination will be practiced is not
enough. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that equal protection to
all must be given, not merely promised.”114 And it is this promise of inclusion and participation that will ultimately be sacrificed by the COVID-19
pandemic as a record number of Americans join the distinct and cognizable group of people in poverty.
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IV. Protest, Pandemic, and Agency
In May and June of 2020, tragic events pressed many Americans to
comprehend the ugly reality of prejudice and bias. One man’s painful and
prolonged killing resulted in a worldwide protest of focused anger and
determination for permanent change. In observing the death of George
Floyd, Americans observed on a visceral level the “historical disenfranchisement, persistent experience of segregation and discrimination, and
higher exposure to environmental risk factors”115 for people of color.
Residents of St. Louis joined in the worldwide protest, six years after
they had led the world from the streets of Ferguson, Missouri, following the killing of Michael Brown.116 Despite many community efforts in
Ferguson and throughout the nation,117 it seemed like little had changed
since 2014.
Arguably, because America’s highest courts had not internalized
the voices on the streets of Ferguson, little changed for Black residents.
Calls for change may start from the street, but to succeed, such demands
must be given value by American courts, which are tasked with protecting
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
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equal participation on American juries. The U.S. Supreme Court fails to
recognize in its rulings how people of color are still being struck from
juries because they are Black or Brown and excluded by bias that resides
deep in the minds of legal professionals.118 In cases in which Batson v. Kentucky119—and Baston’s more recent affirmation, Foster120—are applied,
the Court continues to rely on antiquated, feel-good standards, requiring opposing counsel to satisfy the heavy burden of proving purposeful
discrimination when trial attorneys and prosecutors make racially-motivated peremptory strikes.121 The existence of unprovable implicit bias is
increasingly more devastating to the cause of justice, as the phenomena
of all-white juries continues to be a reality.122 “The practice of systematically excluding black jurors has not been halted by Batson; the only thing
that has changed is that prosecutors must come up with a race-neutral
excuse for the [peremptory] strikes—an exceedingly easy task.”123
Agency in our system of justice is denied to people of color and
people in poverty when the U.S. Supreme Court fails to equate the pervasiveness of structural racism with the “systematic exclusion” of minority
populations in the jury-selection process.124 The “systematic exclusion”
roadblock of Duren125 and Berghuis II126 is similar to the “purposeful
discrimination” obstacle of Batson127 and Foster.128 In fair cross-section
claims, the Court must abandon its outdated analysis under the Sixth
Amendment of ineffectual protections and adopt an expanded view of
equal protection for potential jurors of color and for those in poverty.
These distinctive individuals are much more than a protected class—they
are actual citizens not being recognized or accommodated for jury service. Their agency in the justice system is denied by the Court’s implicit
collaboration with prejudice.
This historical moment of protest and pandemic has reminded us
that millions of Americans of color have been excluded from full participation in our democratic experiment. When considering a direct impact
on broader reform for the justice system, researchers confirm how diverse juries are “more thorough and competent” than all-white juries and
more likely to consider issues of “system fairness” when deliberating and
returning a verdict.129 A reformation toward racial justice and equity can
Brayer, supra note 7, at 53–54.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 80–81 (1986).
See generally Foster v. Chatman, 136 S.Ct. 1737 (2016).
Brayer, supra note 7, at 54–55.
See id.; see also Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration
in the Age of Colorblindness 121 (2012).
Alexander, supra note 122, at 121.
See Neumeier, supra note 3, at 80.
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363 (1979).
Berghuis v. Smith (Berghuis II), 559 U.S. 314, 332 (2010).
Foster v. Chatman, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 1750–51 (2016).
Brayer, supra note 7, at 54–55.
Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberation, 90 J.
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emerge from thousands of jury rooms across the nation if the “distinctive
knowledge and perspective” of excluded communities is heard.130 While
the direct impact on individuals seeking access to justice is evident, a
more global impact occurs when millions of previously unrecognized
voices are empowered through thousands of jury deliberations and verdicts each week.
“No other institution of government rivals the jury in placing power
so directly in the hands of citizens.”131 In this American democracy, we
vote, we march in the streets, and we voice our opinions on social media,
but only on a jury do unelected and unappointed citizens possess the
direct responsibility for government.132 When large groups of individuals
are racially excluded from their democratic agency over those who possess power, the consent of all people to be policed and judged withers
into nonexistence. James Baldwin best articulated the genesis of this denial of agency in America as “the white man’s profound desire not to be
judged by those who are not white.”133
This reality may reveal why courts implicitly (and in some cases
explicitly) embrace juries that are less thorough and competent and ignore system fairness in deliberations.134 The summer protest of 2020 and
the pandemic clarified how the consent to being policed and judged is
derived from an individual’s right to be equally selected as a controlling
agent over the justice system by way of jury service. Further, the right
to serve is not a tepid right reserved by originalist judges for “citizens”
historically labeled as “virtuous”; rather, jury service is an assertion of (in
Baldwin’s words) a fundamental individual “right to be here”135 guaranteed to Black, Indigenous, and people of color and individuals in poverty.
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Conclusion

How and why does society underserve people in poverty—particularly people of color—who are confronted by the economic, systemic,
environmental, and structural racism that fuels such poverty? It is important to reflect on why the factors that have increased the impact of
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Personality & Soc. Psychol. 597, 608–609 (2006).
130. Jeffery Abramson, We the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy, 10 (2000) (“Precisely because we all inevitably view the evidence at trial
from perspectives shaped by the lives we live in America, diversity is important
to the accuracy of jury verdicts. Representative juries are better able to ‘mix it
up’ during deliberation, the preconceptions of some calling into doubt the predisposition of others . . . . On a representative jury, persuasive people are those
who make arguments capable of convincing across the traditional demographic
divides.”).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. James Baldwin, The Fire Next Time 95 (1962).
134. See Alexander, supra note 122, at 121; see also Sommers, supra note 129, at
608–09.
135. I Am Not Your Negro at 43:00 (Magnolia Pictures 2017) (drawing from archival
footage and unfinished writing of James Baldwin).
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COVID-19 in underresourced populations have also contributed to the
low number of people of color and people in poverty on juries.
The lessons of pandemic and protest must not be lost on the courts
of this country, especially the U.S. Supreme Court and on jurists like
Justice Barrett who fail to see jury service as an individual right.136 The
pandemic has forced many of us to better understand the importance
of quality preventative health care, safe transportation, and digital connection. The protest movement awakened many to how these essential
elements of modern life are not equally accessible to people of color and
people in poverty and how this tragedy is often exacerbated by intentional and cruel racism. Low- or no-income people of color have been denied
the chance to serve on American juries because their imposed poverty and the disinvestment in their community has made it comparatively
more difficult to get a state ID or register to vote, thus preventing them
from being considered on a source list to receive a jury summons. If a
summons is received, the condition of imposed poverty has made it more
difficult (if not impossible with COVID-19) for marginalized residents to
participate in jury proceedings.
Agency-for-all in our system of justice has been demanded and
must be provided by way of an expansive view of the Equal Protection
Clause. Antiquated requirements of proving “systematic exclusion” to a
“distinctive group” is a false Sixth Amendment protection that has little
meaning in an age in which the structural remnants of discrimination,
segregation, and disenfranchisement still remain firmly in place. Administrators, legislators, and courts must immediately remedy the lack
of minority representation on juries by expanding source list recognition beyond current records that inherently reduce the participation of
people of color and people in poverty. As the country emerges from
the COVID-19 era, administrators and courts must provide a safe and
healthy environment for juror participation, healthy modes of transportation to jury service, and equal opportunities for remote participation
for all individuals in marginalized communities. To do any less, as we
emerge from this collective tragedy, is to deny the lessons learned from
the sacrifice of those truly virtuous citizens who have suffered the most
from disease and prejudice.

136. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 454, 464 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).

t research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstra

ev
iew
e
rr
ee
tp
no
rin
t

rep

t research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstra

